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Abstract
Management of systemic risk in financial markets is traditionally associated with setting (higher) capital
requirements for market participants. There are indications that while equity ratios have been increased
massively since the financial crisis, systemic risk levels might not have lowered, but even increased (see
ECB data1; SRISK time series2). It has been shown that systemic risk is to a large extent related to the
underlying network topology of financial exposures. A natural question arising is how much systemic risk
can be eliminated by optimally rearranging these networks and without increasing capital requirements.
Overlapping portfolios with minimized systemic risk which provide the same market functionality as empir-
ical ones have been studied by Pichler et al. (2018). Here we propose a similar method for direct exposure
networks, and apply it to cross-sectional interbank loan networks, consisting of 10 quarterly observations
of the Austrian interbank market. We show that the suggested framework rearranges the network topol-
ogy, such that systemic risk is reduced by a factor of approximately 3.5, and leaves the relevant economic
features of the optimized network and its agents unchanged. The presented optimization procedure is not
intended to actually re-configure interbank markets, but to demonstrate the huge potential for systemic
risk management through rearranging exposure networks, in contrast to increasing capital requirements
that were shown to have only marginal effects on systemic risk (Poledna et al., 2017). Ways to actually
incentivize a self-organized formation toward optimal network configurations were introduced in Thurner
and Poledna (2013) and Poledna and Thurner (2016). For regulatory policies concerning financial market
stability the knowledge of minimal systemic risk for a given economic environment can serve as a benchmark
for monitoring actual systemic risk in markets.
Keywords: systemic risk-efficiency, interbank market, financial networks, contagion, network
optimization, mixed-integer linear programming, DebtRank
1. Introduction
Increasing capital requirements for market participants is an obvious suggestion for improving the re-
silience of financial systems, and in particular for reducing systemic risk in financial markets. Examples for
such policies, where capital requirements depend on macro prudential regulation are Cont et al. (2010), who
1ECB Statistical Data Warehouse: Consolidated banking data set
2https://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk/
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propose capital requirements in relation to the Contagion Index values of banks, Gauthier et al. (2012) sug-
gest that bank capital buffers should correspond to their contributions to overall systemic risk, or Markose
(2012) proposes a capital surcharge related to the eigenvector centrality of banks in the financial network.
Also in the classical risk measure literature following Artzner et al. (1999) and Fo¨llmer and Schied (2002) the
risk of an asset is measured by the amount of capital that needs to be added to the position in order to make
the position acceptable to the regulator, or to the firm itself. This approach can be extended to determine
the capital requirements for financial institutions to bring systemic risk to levels, which are acceptable to
the regulator, see e.g. Feinstein et al. (2017) or Biagini et al. (2018).
In the recent past, after the last financial crisis, bank capital requirements have been adjusted upwards.
In the Basel III accord the regulatory minimum capital requirements for Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1)
have been increased from 2% to 4.5%, and Tier 1 Capital from 4% to 6% BCBS (2011a). Additionally,
a capital conservation buffer has been introduced by increasing CET1 and Tier 1 capital further to 7%
and 8.5%, respectively. On top of this, national authorities can set an additional counter-cyclical buffer
in the range between zero and 2.5% for phases of excessive credit growth. Global systemically important
institutions have to meet additional CET1 requirements in a range of 1% to 2.5% BCBS (2011c).
Bank capital levels have been steadily increasing since the introduction of these new regulations. The
monitoring report of the Basel Committee BCBS (2011b) shows that for a sample of 86 international banks
with Tier 1 Capital larger than $3bn the CET1 increased from 7.2% to 12.7% in the period from 2011 to
2018 (BCBS, 2011b, Graph 15). For Germany, Spain, France, and Italy ECB data shows increases of Tier
1 capital ratios from 9.2%, 8.1%, 8.4% and 6.9% to 16.4%, 13.2%, 15.3%, and 14.4%, respectively for the
period from 2008 to 20173. Nonetheless, some indicators of systemic risk suggest that systemic risk levels
are not declining, but are still substantially higher than before the financial crises. A prominent example is
the SRISK indicator of Brownlees and Engle (2016), which shows that the systemic risk level in Europe is
twice as high than before the crises4.
However, capital levels for absorbing shocks are only one part of the story in the context of systemic
risk. The other essential component that determines systemic risk is the exposure network that is generated
by contracts between financial agents. In particular, these networks capture the risks of potential cascading
events that could threaten large fractions of financial markets to fail. This fact is reflected in a number of
works such as in Allen and Gale (2000), Freixas et al. (2000), Eisenberg and Noe (2001), Boss et al. (2004a),
Cont et al. (2010), Gai and Kapadia (2010), Battiston et al. (2012c), Markose et al. (2012) Thurner and
Poledna (2013), Glasserman and Young (2015).
It is therefore natural to ask what contributions to systemic risk originate specifically from networks,
and how their topology influences systemic risk. Indeed, many contributions to the systemic risk literature
investigate the effect of network characteristics on systemic risk. Allen and Gale (2000) compare the effects
of different network topologies, such as rings, fully connected graphs, and interconnected subgroups on the
interbank market stability. In Boss et al. (2004a) the role of scale free network topologies in the context
of systemic risk and stability is discussed. In Boss et al. (2004b) the betweenness centrality measure is
introduced as a network-based measure for systemic risk. Nier et al. (2007) investigate the effects of network
connectivity and concentration on contagious defaults. Gai and Kapadia (2010) employ a stylized analytical
contagion model and look at the fraction of defaulting banks for given average degrees. Puhr et al. (2012)
employ panel regressions to study the effects of network measures like Katz centrality on the number of
defaulting banks, which are obtained from a simulation study. The concept of too interconnected to fail is
also part of this discussion and is investigated for example by Markose et al. (2012). Glasserman and Young
(2016) dedicate a considerable part of their literature review to this topic. These and many more theoretical
and empirical works indicate the possibility to use networks of financial connections as a leverage point
for reducing systemic risk in a financial system as an effective alternative to costly capital requirements
that were shown to have limited effects on systemic risk reduction (Poledna et al., 2017). If systemic risk
can indeed be effectively reduced by altering the underlying exposure network characteristics, this should
3ECB Statistical Data Warehouse: Consolidated banking data set
4SRISK levels for different regions are provided by https://vlab.stern.nyu.edu/welcome/risk/
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be prominently factored into financial market stability policies. It is therefore essential to systematically
estimate the full potential for network-based systemic risk reduction.
In this work we propose a method for quantifying the systemic risk reduction potential in empirically
observed direct exposure networks by employing standard optimization techniques. The systemic risk of
a network is measured with the so-called DebtRank (Battiston et al., 2012c). The actual optimization
relies on an approximation of the DebtRank, which is computed iteratively and is thus hard to be used in
optimization. The approximation is based on the direct impacts of defaulting banks on their neighboring
nodes in the exposure network. We show how the systemic risk optimization can be solved as a mixed integer
linear program (MILP) by standard reformulation techniques. The optimization problem can be solved by
state of the art optimization algorithms and could therefore also be easily implemented in practice. In the
empirical part of this study we show the effectiveness of the proposed method by applying it to a data set
containing ten quarterly observations of the Austrian interbank liability network from 2006 to 2008. Our
findings for the largest 70 banks suggest that the DebtRank of individual banks can be reduced on average
by a factor of 3.5. This means sizeable reductions of the DebtRank for almost all of the 70 banks across the
ten quarters with only few exceptions.
In practice, due to the current lack of incentive schemes for systemic risk management (Leduc and
Thurner, 2017), financial networks do not evolve toward systemically optimal configurations, and obviously
they do not result in any way from such optimization procedures. However, our study can give an estimate
for the systemic risk reduction potential stemming from a specific reorganization of empirically observed
networks. The same optimization algorithm can be used to compute network configurations that yield a
maximum of overall systemic risk. In this way, for any observed financial network, the proposed optimization
procedure yields a “range” of network structures, corresponding to minimal and maximum DebtRank. This
allows us to identify network characteristics that are typical for low, medium, and high DebtRank.
Closely related studies include Poledna and Thurner (2016) and Leduc and Thurner (2017), which
investigate how systemic risk can be reduced by changing the underlying networks, when financial agents
are incentivized to favor transactions with low systemic risk in the network. The idea of applying network
optimization techniques that are a commonly used in operations research to systemic risk reduction is
relatively new. It has been pioneered in the specific context of overlapping portfolios and fire sales by
Pichler et al. (2018) who find reductions of systemic risk of around 50% by rearranging the network structure
of the European government bond market. The optimization approach there however – a quadratically
constrained quadratic program (QCQP) – is substantially different from the one presented here. A recent
paper by Krause et al. (2019) focuses on small homogeneous macroeconomic shocks affecting the assets
of all banks simultaneously and how these shocks are amplified in the banking system. They show a
Monte Carlo algorithm for finding minimal and maximal networks with respect to the amplification of such
small homogeneous macro shocks. Another related study is Aldasoro et al. (2017). The authors employ a
theoretical model of the interbank network where optimizing risk-averse banks invest in illiquid assets and
lend to each other. In their model they account for contagion originating from liquidity hoarding, interbank
interlinkages and fire sales. Their model leads to a specific interbank network for which properties of the
network topology are reported.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our approach to quantify systemic risk. In Section
3 we derive the optimization problem for reducing DebtRank. We discuss the data and the results of the
application to the Austrian interbank market in detail in Section 4, before we conclude in Section 5.
2. Quantifying systemic risk
Quantification of systemic risk in financial networks is a non-trivial task and depends on the specific
aspects of interest. Based on very different ideas, various systemic risk measures were suggested. Some
such as those that are based on networks, were already mentioned above. Other well known approaches
include the ∆CoVaR, that measures the tail dependence of bank asset returns by Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2016), systemic expected shortfall (SES) by Acharya et al. (2017) measuring the tendency of a bank
being undercapitalized if the whole system is undercapitalized, the SRISK measure proposed by Brownlees
and Engle (2016), or the put option portfolio approach by Lehar (2005). The advantage of these market
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based measures for systemic risk measurement is that they do not require the detailed (often restricted)
information of financial networks but estimate systemic risk from openly accessible data. These models lack
the possibility to estimate the contributions from cascading effects through financial exposure networks.
The difference between these two strands of literature is emphasized by Benoit et al. (2017).
Here we choose the network-based measure DebtRank as a way to quantify systemic risk. The following
method for minimizing systemic risk is then applicable to all direct financial exposure networks, whenever
DebtRank is used as the measure for systemic risk. Examples for analyzing systemic risk on networks include
interbank networks (Battiston et al., 2012c; Thurner and Poledna, 2013), derivatives and foreign exchange
(Poledna et al., 2015), and credit-default swaps (Leduc et al., 2017). Without loss of generality for any kind
of direct exposure network, we demonstrate the method for interbank asset-liability networks.
We model the interbank market with N banks as a directed weighted network represented by the asset-
liability matrix, L. The nodes represent banks, links are the liabilities between banks. If bank j lends Lij
(monetary units) to bank i, we represent this as a directed link from node i to node j with a corresponding
weight of Lij . Lij is j’s exposure towards i, i.e. if i defaults the amount Lij is at risk for j. We denote the
total interbank liabilities of bank i to all others in the network by li =
∑N
j=1 Lij ; the sum of all loans from
i to other banks is ai =
∑N
j=1 Lji. The equity of bank i is denoted by ei, and the total interbank market
volume in the network is L¯ =
∑N
i=1 li =
∑N
i=1 ai. The relative weight of bank i in the network is vi = ai/L¯.
In the case of the default of i, we assume that bank j needs to write off Lij of its assets5. Since a bank
cannot have negative equity, the maximum impact that i can have on j is ej . This motivates the definition
of the direct impact matrix,
Wij = min
(
Lij
ej
, 1
)
, (1)
which denotes the share of j’s equity lost due to the default of bank i.
As stated above, we quantify systemic risk by using DebtRank. DebtRank is a recursive centrality
measure designed specifically for networks of direct financial exposures and quantifies the impact of bank i
on the entire network if i defaults. Every bank i has a DebtRank value, Ri, between zero and one; Ri = 0
means that bank i has no impact on other banks, whereas Ri = 1 indicates that the entire interbank asset
weighted equity of the system is at risk, should i default6. In that sense, Ri is the fraction of the affected
total value in the network by i’s default.
Definition 1 (DebtRank). DebtRank is defined by an iterative procedure that involves two state vari-
ables, h and s. hi(t) measures the level of distress at iteration t; it is the fraction of equity, ei, that was lost
due to the default of other banks before t. Consequently, hi(t) ∈ [0, 1], where hi(t) = 1 means default. The
variable sj(t) ∈ {U,D, I} takes one of three states: undistressed, distressed, and inactive. The variables are
initialized for t = 1, as hi(1) = δij ,7, where j is the bank, which initially defaults, and si(1) = D, for i = j
and si(1) = U , for i , j. The dynamics for the two state variables for t ≥ 2 is defined by first updating
hi(t) simultaneously for all i, followed by an update of si(t), for all i. The update rules are given by
hi(t) = min
1, hi(t− 1) +∑
j
Wjihj(t− 1)
 , (2)
where the summation over j runs over all j, for which sj(t− 1) = D, and
si(t) =

D if hi(t) > 0 ; si(t− 1) , I
I if si(t− 1) = D
si(t− 1) otherwise .
(3)
5For simplicity we assume zero recovery. Note that this assumption is not entirely unrealistic for short time scales, and is
frequently used in the literature.
6From the definition of DebtRank it becomes obvious that Ri = 1 can only occur if the weight vi = 0. Thus, in most cases
Ri is strictly smaller than one.
7δij is the Kronecker symbol, δij = 1 if i = j, and δij = 0, otherwise.
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The iterative procedure ends after T steps at which all nodes are either undistressed or inactive. The
DebtRank of bank i is defined as
Ri =
N∑
j=1
hj(T )vj −
N∑
j=1
hj(1)vj =
∑
j,i
hj(T )vj . (4)
The last equality holds because we assume that only bank i initially defaults, leading to hi(1) = hi(T ) = 1.
We define the systemic risk of the entire market as the sum of the individual bank DebtRanks, i.e.
R =
N∑
i=1
Ri . (5)
For a motivation of this definition, see also Poledna and Thurner (2016). For comparison purposes, we also
employ a variation of this definition of DebtRank that was presented in Bardoscia et al. (2015). We refer to
this definition as DebtRank2. For more details, see Appendix C. DebtRank2 has been suggested as a micro
foundation for shock propagation in networks and is derived from bank balance sheet identities directly.
Bardoscia et al. (2015) acknowledge that the original DebtRank formulation can lead to underestimations
of systemic risk, because shocks only propagate through a node for a single time and subsequently the node
becomes inactive. If a bank receives shocks from different neighbors at sequential times it only transmits the
first shock since it becomes inactive after receiving the first shock. Similarly, when a bank receiving a shock
is part of a loop and will again receive a shock from the same loop at a later time, it will not forward the
shock a second time. The two DebtRanks are the same for tree networks and some other special structures.
In general, DebtRank is a lower bound to DebtRank2 (Bardoscia et al., 2015). However, since DebtRank2
allows for multiple shock transmissions of a node this leads (in principle) to an infinite number of shocks
on networks that contain loops. In practice, the algorithm stops when the shocks become smaller than a
predefined value . However, in the original DebtRank formulation Battiston et al. (2012c) point out that
an infinite cycling of shocks when loops are present might not be desirable. For this reason and because
in the literature the original DebtRank is more widely used, we stick to the original DebtRank for the rest
of the paper. Another interesting generalization of DebtRank is studied by Bardoscia et al. (2016), which
relaxes the assumption that shocks are propagating linearly.
3. Minimizing systemic risk as an optimization problem
This section proposes an optimization procedure that rewires a given interbank network to obtain a
second (optimal) network that is close to the optimal DebtRank for the prevailing economic environment,
i.e. for a given level of equity, bank lending and borrowing, and bank risk. Because of its recursive definition
in Eq. (4), DebtRank is not representable in closed form. This makes it unpractical to use as the actual
objective function. Even though an optimization with respect to DebtRank is of course possible in principle,
it would be computationally costly, or even infeasible for large networks. We now propose a practical and
easy to implement method that is capable of reducing systemic risk (DebtRank) substantially in empirical
networks. For this, we approximate DebtRank, R, by a sum of piecewise linear concave functions that then
serves as the objective function in the optimization.
Definition 2 (Direct Impact). The direct impact Ii of bank i on its neighbouring banks is defined by
Ii =
N∑
j=1
Wijvj =
1
L¯
N∑
j=1
min
(
Lij
ej
, 1
)
aj . (6)
The sum of all direct impacts is I =
∑N
i=1 Ii, which can be interpreted as a first-order approximation of the
DebtRank.
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Direct impact, I, is representable in closed form, Eq. (6), and its special structure allows us to solve
the optimization problem with Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) techniques. The optimization
procedure rewires links in the network. However, for economic plausibility, it should keep the total assets and
liabilities of banks unchanged, as well as the total network volume, L¯. These requirements are ensured by
corresponding constraints, which have an economic meaning that we discuss in section 3.1. The optimization
problem is now formulated as
min
L∈{M : M∈RN×N+ , Mii=0}
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
min
(
Lij
ej
, 1
)
aj
subject to li =
N∑
j=1
Lij , ∀i
ai =
N∑
j=1
Lji , ∀i . (7)
The values for e, l, a, v, and L¯ can be obtained from balance sheets and the interbank network, L8. The
objective function is not linear but piecewise linear and concave because of the minimum operator; the sum of
concave functions is concave. In Eq. (7) we omit L¯ because it is just a positive multiplicative constant. The
result of the optimization is the optimal asset-liability matrix, L∗. A global optimum exists because of the
concavity of the objective function and due to the bounded solution space (Lij ∈ [0,min(ai, li, aj , lj)] ∀ij).
However, the optimum is not necessarily unique. We find globally optimal solutions by solving an equivalent
Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP), which is derived in the following.
The optimization problem comprises N2 −N free variables (no self-links), which turns even moderately
large interbank markets into large-scale optimization problems. To solve this problem, we linearize the
objective function by reformulating it as a Mixed Integer Linear Program (MILP). Since the minimum
function is piecewise linear, one can apply standard techniques of mathematical programming to rewrite Eq.
(7) as a MILP. We use the concept of special ordered sets (SOS), and more specifically, SOS2 constraints for
the linearization of the objective function. This concept dates back to Beale and Tomlin (1970) and allows
us to find a global solution.
We first provide some intuition of the behavior of the objective function Eq. (7), and then explain the
reformulation in detail. Since all aj are non-negative, we can write them inside the minimum function, and
a single term in the objective function in Eq. (7) reads, min
(aj
ej
Lij , aj
)
. Figure A.5 in the appendix shows
its behavior. It increases until Lij = ej by aj/ej and remains constant afterwards. Below we show how
to relate each entry Lij to a pair of variables, (y2k−1, y2k). y2k−1 accounts for the part of Lij , where the
objective still increases in Lij ; y2k accounts for the region, where the objective function is constant (w.r.t.
Lij). The economic interpretation of the transition point at Lij = ej is that the liability of bank i, with
respect to bank j is of the same size as bank j’s equity. In the case of i’s default, 100% of j’s equity would be
destroyed. However, when Lij > ej , y2k = min(0, Lij − ej) does not affect the objective function anymore,
since more than 100% of j’s equity cannot be consumed. Note that the remaining loss of min(0, Lij − ej)
is born by creditors of j, which are outside the interbank system. We now show more formally how the
objective function can be transformed into a MILP with the help of the variables y and a set of dummy
variables, δ.
We stated the optimization problem in matrix terms. In numerical optimization it is more common to
optimize over vectors. We therefore rewrite L ∈ RN×N+ into a vector x ∈ RN
2
+ by stacking the columns of L,
x = vec(L) = (L11, . . . , LN1, L12 . . . , LN2, L1N , . . . , LNN )> . (8)
8Note that for this optimization only the row and column sums of L are needed, i.e. it can also be performed without the
– usually not accessible – exact network.
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Note that for ease of notation and implementation we keep the diagonal entries Lii, ∀i. Similarly, we define
vectors of length N2 for representing assets, liabilities, and equities,
e¯ = (e1, . . . , e1︸        ︷︷        ︸
N times
, e2, . . . , eN , . . . , eN︸          ︷︷          ︸
N times
)> , (9)
a¯ = (a1, . . . , a1︸        ︷︷        ︸
N times
, a2, . . . , aN , . . . , aN︸           ︷︷           ︸
N times
)> , (10)
and
l¯ = (l, . . . , l︸    ︷︷    ︸
N times
)> . (11)
Now we can write the objective function in Eq. (7) as
min
x∈RN2+
∑N2
j=1 min
(
a¯j
e¯j
xj , a¯j
)
. (12)
The elements in x corresponding to the diagonal elements of L have to be zero, which can be enforced with
additional constraints, or directly in the optimization software. To translate the objective function into a
linear form c>y, every variable xi is split into two parts, y2i−1 and y2i, with xi = y2i−1 + y2i, and
y2i−1 = min(xi, e¯i) , (13)
y2i = min(xi − e¯i, 0) . (14)
The first part, y2i−1, indicates the range of xi, where an increase ∆xi leads to an increase of the objective
function by ∆xi(a¯i/e¯i). At xi = e¯i, the objective function does no longer increase with xi. This range of xi
is accounted for by y2i. To reformulate the objective function in terms of the new variables y, we need to
introduce a vector of binary variables δ ∈ {0, 1}2n2 in the following way
δj =
{
1 if yj > 0
0 if yj = 0 .
With δ we can formulate the following constraints for the pairs (y2i−1, y2i), for all i,
δ2i−1 ≥ δ2i (15)
y2i−1 ≥ δ2ie¯i (16)
y2i−1 ≤ δ2i−1e¯i (17)
y2i ≤ δ2i max
(
0,min
(
a¯i, l¯i
)− e¯i) . (18)
Constraints (15) - (18) ensure the equivalence of the reformulated problem in Eq. (20), and the original
problem in Eq. (7). In particular, Eq. (15) enforces that y2i can only be larger than zero if y2i−1 is larger
than zero. Constraints (16) and (17) enforce that y2i−1 must be smaller than e¯i, and that if y2i is bigger
than zero, y2i−1 has to be equal to e¯i. Finally, Eq. (18) ensures that xi = y2i−1 + y2i is smaller than the
respective row and column sum of the corresponding entry in the liability matrix. We finally define the
vector c of length 4N2, which determines the slope with which the respective entries in y increase,
cj =

a¯i
e¯i
if j = 2i− 1 , and i ≤ N2
0 if j = 2i , and i ≤ N2
0 if 2N2 < j ≤ 4N2 .
(19)
It follows that every second entry in c2i is equal to zero, since the even components y2i are not increasing the
objective function. They correspond to the part of xi, where the objective function is capped to a¯i. The odd
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parts, c2i−1, represent the slopes. The last 2N2 zeros ensure that the binary variables δ do not affect the
value of the objective function. The objective function can now be written as c>z, where z = (y, δ) ∈ R4n2 .
The constraints for δ and y, Eqs. (15) – (18), are compactly reformulated as A1z = 0, where A1 ∈
R4n2×4N2 , and 0 denotes a zero-vector of length 4N2. The constraints on the row and column sums of the
liability matrix in the initial problem, Eq. (7), can be written in standard matrix form as A2z = a, and
A3z = l. A2 and A3 are N × 4N2 dimensional matrices consisting of zeros and ones9. The exact structure
of the constraint matrices A1, A2, and A3 is outlined in Appendix A. Finally, the optimization problem of
Eq. (7) as a MILP reads
min
z∈R4N2+
c>z (20)
subject to A1z ≤ 0 (21)
A2z = a (22)
A3z = l . (23)
This method is generic and is generally applicable to all direct financial exposure networks, where systemic
risk is quantified by DebtRank. If different types of financial network are considered, the liability matrix
L has to be replaced with the corresponding exposure matrices. Depending on the financial network type,
various further constraints can be considered to ensure that certain economic properties of individual banks
(which depend on the network but should kept constant) indeed remain the same after the optimization.
We continue by discussing such constraints in more detail.
3.1. Implementing economic constraints
As mentioned, the constraints in Eq. (7) ensure not only that banks retain their size after optimization,
but they also have an important economic interpretation. Row and column sums represent the interbank
liabilities and interbank assets of each bank. Keeping these constant implies that each bank retains its
amount of liquidity10 from the interbank market after optimization. If we assume that the liquidity a bank
requires from the interbank market originates from its operational business, it is important that this activity
is not distorted by the optimization procedure.
Another important type of economic constraint is related to economic risk. In direct exposure networks
counter-party credit risk plays an important role when making lending decisions. In the case of indirect
exposure networks, such as overlapping portfolio risk, risk associated to the financial assets, which are held
by the financial institutions play a crucial role when making investment decisions. The most important types
are credit, market, and interest rate risk. For the sake of comparability of empirically observed reference
networks and optimized networks, it is desirable to have constraints, which ensure that the risks for the
individual institutions remain comparable before and after optimization.
For interbank networks none of the lending banks should end up with a higher counter-party credit risk
after the optimization. To achieve this, we introduce another linear constraint to ensure that the credit
risk in all interbank loan portfolios is approximately maintained. This constraint accounts for individual
economic conditions of banks, which are affected by the network structure. We aim to model this feature
by fixing the predominant credit risk weighted exposure of the interbank loan portfolio of each bank.
Let the considered credit risk indicator of bank i be κi. For a given liability matrix L, the risk weighted
interbank loan exposure of bank j, that is implied by the interbank network L, is then given by rj =∑N
i=1 Lijκi, or in matrix notation, r = L>κ . To include this constraint in the MILP of Eq. (20) we need
to translate r to
A4z = L>κ . (24)
9Note that there is at least one redundant equation in this set of linear constraints, since N column sums and N − 1 row
sums imply the Nth row sum.
10Since we deal only with a single liability matrix, L, we implicitly assume in the optimization procedure that all liabilities
have the same maturity, which is of course not realistic. If a family of matrices, L1, . . . , Lt, describing the interbank liabilities
for various maturities (or maturity buckets) 1, . . . , t is available, and the optimization procedure is applied to each maturity
separately, then the original maturity structure is unaffected.
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Figure 1: (a) Total DebtRank, R, of the empirical Austrian interbank networks across 10 quarters from 2006 to 2008 (squares).
For the optimized networks the DebtRank is drastically reduced (triangles). The optimization reduces systemic risk (measured
in DebtRank) by a factor of approximately 3.5. (b) Individual DebtRank, Ri, of 70 banks for the empirical and optimized
networks in the respective quarters. Here symbol sizes are proportional to the banks’ interbank liabilities, li. We see that
typically large banks have high Ri, however note that there are many exceptions with small banks having considerable systemic
risk. (c) Total interbank market volume, L¯, and equity, E¯ =
∑N
i=1 ei, over the ten quarters. While decreasing in the first eight
quarters, the ratio L¯/E¯ increases substantially in Q9 and Q10.
Details of the matrix A4 are found in Appendix A. We explain in Appendix E that the formulation of
constraint Eq. (24) as equality and smaller or equal yield the same optimal value of the problem in Eq. (20),
given that the row and column sum constraints are in place. Further, this constraint also keeps the earnings
from the interbank loan portfolio similar before and after optimization, because the interest rate earned
on an interbank loan should strongly reflect the credit risk level of the borrower. Additionally, also the
regulatory capital levied on the interbank loan portfolio remains comparable, because capital requirements
depend on the risk weighted assets of the respective bank. Since the risk weighted interbank loan exposure
remains constant in the optimization, also the risk weighted assets should retain their size.
For the case of optimizing indirect exposure networks, similar risk constraints can be implemented.
For example, Pichler et al. (2018) consider Markowitz mean-variance conditions for optimizing financial
exposures emerging from common asset holdings and discuss further possible constraints. Other meaningful
constraints for financial asset networks are credit risk constraints, such that the average credit risk – of e.g.
a bond portfolio – remains comparable. To keep the interest rate risk of fixed income portfolios similar
across the optimization, another linear constraint can account for the maturity or duration of the assets. In
general, different financial networks will require different economic constraints.
4. Optimization of empirical Austrian interbank networks
The solution to the MILP yields a network with minimal direct impacts, I, but not necessarily one
with minimal systemic risk in terms of DebtRank, R. However, our computations demonstrate the great
effectiveness of this approximation in massively reducing overall systemic risk.
We apply the optimization to a data set consisting of 10 snapshots of Austrian interbank networks at
10 quarters from 2006 to 2008. The Austrian interbank network has been studied before by e.g. Boss
et al. (2004a), Elsinger et al. (2006), Caccioli et al. (2015)11. The sample contains between 824 and 846
banks. The Austrian banking system accommodates many very small cooperative banks, which can not
be considered as systemically important. We use the 70 largest banks with respect to total assets in the
corresponding quarter for numerical feasibility. These account for about 86% of total assets; the 70th largest
bank accounts for around 0.12% of total assets. The 70 banks with the largest total assets cover around 71%
of the interbank market. We choose the banks’ total asset size as the selection criterion because total assets
should be a more stable quantity than interbank market shares. We deal with a fully anonymized data set,
which makes it impossible to estimate the bank’s credit risk indicators, κi. Approaches for estimating κ
11Caccioli et al. (2015) uses the same data set that originally consisted of 12 quarters. Due to obvious data errors we dropped
2 of the 12 observations.
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Figure 2: Systemic risk profile (DebtRank Ri) of the 70 banks for the empirical (red) and the minimized (blue) networks in
quarter Q1. Banks are rank ordered with respect to their DebtRank, Ri, in the empirical network. It is visible that systemic
risk is drastically reduced for practically all banks, with only one exception. For the 10 most risky banks a reduction of
DebtRank, Ri by a factor of 2.1 is observed, for higher ranks, the reduction by a factor of 5.1 is even more drastic. Similar
results hold for the other quarters.
are outlined in Section Appendix D for the case that sufficient data would be available. For demonstration
purposes we approximate κ by the leverage ratio of the banks
κi =
total assetsi
total assetsi − total liabilitiesi . (25)
We assume that a higher leverage ratio implies higher credit risk.
To solve the optimization problem numerically, we employ the MILP solver cplex, available in the R
Optimisation Infrastructure (ROI) package (Theußl et al., 2019). The optimization can be performed on a
standard notebook and takes between a few minutes to several hours, depending on the network sample.
4.1. Results
The reduction of systemic risk obtained by the optimization procedure is summarized in Figure 1 (a). The
values of the total DebtRank, R, after optimization are substantially lower than the corresponding empirical
ones across all quarters. The average DebtRank in the empirical and optimized networks are around 12.51
and 3.54, respectively, meaning that the average total DebtRank reduction amounts to approximately 71%,
or a factor of roughly 3.5. Figure 1 (b) shows the individual DebtRanks, Ri, of the 70 banks for the empirical
case (red squares) and the optimized (blue triangles). The size of the symbols represents the banks’ interbank
liabilities, li. The figure shows two facts. The first is that in the optimized network at least one bank always
remains relatively systemically risky with respect to the bulk of banks, even though their DebtRank is
substantially reduced. The second observation is that the DebtRank reduction for small and medium sized
banks, indicated by triangle size, seems to work even better than for the large banks. Figure B.7 shows
the relationship of DebtRank Ri and interbank liabilities li in more detail. In the empirical networks small
banks severely “punch above their weight”, i.e. banks with small interbank liabilities frequently have high
DebtRanks, Ri, and their default would cause – judging by their size – unnecessary systemic events. The
optimization remedies this problem and renders banks with small interbank liabilities systemically negligible.
In Figure 1 (a) it is seen that from Q8 to Q10 the optimized DebtRank increases, while the empirical
DebtRank continues its downward trend. To understand why, in Figure 1 (c) we show the total interbank
market volume and the total equity in the system over time, relative to the values in Q1. Larger levels
of equity—all other things kept equal—should reduce DebtRank, and an increase of the market volume
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Figure 3: (a) Total DebtRank values, R, versus direct impacts, I, for the 10 quarters of the empirical (squares) and the
optimized networks (triangles). The correlation coefficients of R and I for the empirical and optimized cases are ρemp = 0.81,
with a p-value of 0.004, and ρopt = 0.6, with a p-value of 0.07, respectively. (b) Shows the same comparison on the individual
bank level, Ri versus Ii, with ρemp = 0.90, and ρopt = 0.9. The associated p-values are smaller than 2.2e-16. The dashed lines
are obtained by simple linear regression.
should increase DebtRank. Thus, the sharp increase of the market volume, L¯, from Q8 to Q10 could be the
explanation for the observed increase in the optimized DebtRank.
Figure 2 depicts the systemic risk profile for Q1, where Ri is shown for 70 banks of the empirical and the
optimized case. Banks are ordered according to their empirical DebtRank, Ri; the most systemically risky
institution is shown to the very left. The effectiveness of the optimization is clearly seen. DebtRank levels
are decreased substantially for almost all 70 banks, with two exceptions, where banks have a slightly higher
DebtRank after the optimization. For the 10 most risky banks (left of vertical line) DebtRank is reduced
by a factor of around 2.1, for higher ranks, the reduction is even more pronounced, and amounts to a factor
of 5.1. For most banks, DebtRank is decreased to marginal levels. Similar observations hold true for all
quarters; in some a DebtRank reduction is achieved for all 70 banks.
Figure 3 shows the relation of our objective function (direct impacts), I, and DebtRank, R, that serves as
our measure of systemic risk, with which we also judge the effectiveness of the optimization. On the network
level, the total DebtRank and direct impacts of the empirical networks are linearly related with a correlation
coefficient of ρemp = 0.81, and a p-value of pemp = 0.004. This confirms a posteriori that minimizing the
direct impacts is indeed a reasonable and effective way to minimize DebtRank. In the optimized networks the
linear relationship is weaker (ρopt = 0.6, and a p-value of popt = 0.07). This indicates that the optimization
achieves a stronger reduction in direct impacts than in DebtRank. Figure 3 (b) shows the same situation
for the bank’s individual levels of DebtRank, Ri, and direct impacts, Ii. The linear correlations for both
network types are higher (ρemp = ρopt = 0.9) and their p-values are below 2.2e-16. The respective results for
DebtRank2 (Bardoscia et al. (2015)) are shown in Appendix C. Here, the optimization achieves an average
reduction of DebtRank2 of about 15%.
4.2. How networks change during optimization
Figure 4 (a) shows the original interbank asset-liability network L before the optimization for quarter
Q1. The case after optimization is seen in (b). The nodes represent banks, size is the banks’ equity, the
colors represent the DebtRank value (dark red is high, light tones are medium, dark blue is low Ri). There
are obvious differences. We now ask how the topology of interbank networks changes due to the optimization
process. The average degree of the minimized network (from the binary adjacency matrix) is k¯ = 3.04 versus
the empirical network k¯ = 38.71.
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Figure 4: Interbank networks before and after optimization. (a) Empirical asset-liability network, L, as in Q1, in comparison
to (b) the optimized network, L∗. Node colors of banks represent their DebtRank (large DebtRank is red, small is blue).
Node size is proportional to equity, ei. It is obvious that the optimized network is considerably sparser. (c) DebtRank of
the empirical, the minimized, and the maximized networks plotted against the networks’ link densities, d. Every symbol
represents a quarter. It is visible that sparse networks can have both, high and low DebtRank. (d) DebtRank, R, against
the degree-weighted assortativity, r. We see a similar level of dis-assortativity in the maximized and minimized networks,
while the empirical network is more assortative, and the thresholded empirical network is less assortative. (e) DebtRank, R,
plotted against the mean local clustering coefficient, c¯. We see that there is a tendency towards higher local clustering in
the empirical network. The minimized and the thresholded networks show similar average clustering. The average clustering
in the maximized networks is slightly higher than in the minimized networks. (f) DebtRank, R, plotted against the average
weighted nearest neighbor degrees, k¯wnn. The smallest values are observed for the minimized network, followed by the maximized
networks. The thresholded networks exhibit higher, the empirical networks substantially higher values.
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The in- and out-degree distributions for the different network types pooled together for all ten quarters
are provided in Figure B.8 (a) and (b). The average in- and out- strength of the networks are unchanged,
due to the constraints that keep ai (in-strength) and li (out-strength) fixed.
The most prominent observation is that networks after the optimization become sparser. Figure 4 (c)
shows that the minimized network (blue triangles) is extremely sparse with an average link density of
around 4.4%. Every dot represents one of the 10 quarters. The link density of the network (connectancy)
is defined as the fraction of links being present in the network, d = m/(N(N − 1)), where m is the number
of present links and N(N − 1) is the number of possible links. In contrast, the empirical networks (red
squares) exhibit an average link density of approximately 56%. Note however, that by slightly thresholding
the empirical networks, link densities of about 10% are obtained, see Appendix B. One could be led to
believe that high link density is related to high DebtRank. This is not necessarily true. To show this, we
computed the maximum direct impact networks (where we maximize Eq. (20)), which leads to networks
with higher DebtRank than the empirically observed ones. Interestingly, these maximized networks (green
diamonds) are also sparse, with an average link density of 11%. The maximized and thresholded networks
are visualized in Figure B.6. Sparse networks can have low or high DebtRank. Also Krause et al. (2019)
find for their optimization that the minimized and maximized networks are considerably sparser than the
original network. For a sample of 53 banks they report an average degree of k¯ = 14.4 for the reference
network and an average degree of k¯ = 2 for their minimized and maximized networks each. Aldasoro et al.
(2017) find for a network of 20 banks (obtained from a theoretical model, where banks lend/borrow in an
optimal way w.r.t. their utility function) a link density of around 7.3%.
In Figure 4 (d) DebtRank R is plotted against the degree assortativity, which is calculated as
r =
∑
i jiki −m−1
∑
i
∑
i′ jiki′√(∑
i j
2
i −m−1
(∑
i ji
)2) (∑
i k
2
i −m−1
(∑
i ki
)2) , (26)
where ji is the excess in-degree and ki the excess out-degree of the nodes, which are at the beginning and
the end of link i, and m is the number of all links (Newman, 2003, Eq. (26)). We report the average of
the ten assortativity coefficients for the four network types: empirical −0.23, minimized −0.37, maximized
−0.39 and thresholded −0.47. We see that the minimized and maximized networks tend to have a similar
degree assortativity, whereas the empirical networks are more assortative, and the thresholded network more
disassortative.
A similar picture is found for the clustering coefficient, c¯. We compute it from the unweighted undirected
(symmetrized) adjacency matrix for each of the ten quarters. The clustering coefficient of the network is
defined as c¯ = 1/N
∑N
i=1 Ci, where the local clustering coefficient Ci of node i is defined as the number of
connected pairs of neighbors of i, divided by the number of pairs of neighbors of i. Figure 4 (e) plots the
clustering coefficients c¯ for each quarter against the DebtRank, R, of the respective quarter. The average of
the clustering coefficients for the ten quarters is 0.86 for the empirical, 0.54 for the minimized, 0.58 for the
maximized, and 0.54 for the thresholded network. Again, the average clustering coefficient for the minimized
and maximized networks show a similar behavior. To give a more detailed picture of the clustering behavior,
we show the histogram of local clustering coefficients, Ci, for the different network types pooled for all ten
observations in Figure B.8 (c). Approximately in line with these numbers, in their theoretical model Leduc
and Thurner (2017) report average clustering coefficients for 500 networks of about c¯ ∼ 0.7, for networks with
usual systemic risk levels, while for networks that are obtained under a systemic risk tax (that systematically
reduces systemic risk by incentivizing agents), they find c¯ ∼ 0.3.
Finally, in Figure 4 (f) we study the average weighted nearest neighbor degree, k¯wnn =
∑N
i=1 k
w
nn,i,
where kwnn,i is defined as kwnn,i = (ai + li)−1
∑N
j=1(Lij + Lji)kj . The degree of the neighbors of node i
are weighted with the size of the mutual exposure between them and are standardized by the sum of is’
interbank liabilities and assets. We report the values for the empirical 63, minimized 16, maximized 21, and
thresholded 30 networks. For the mean weighted nearest neighbor degree a notable difference between the
minimized and maximized networks is observed. However, both types exhibit much smaller values than the
empirical networks. The distribution of kwnn,i across all ten observations is shown in B.8 (d).
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These findings in the network topology measures clearly indicate that there are substantial differences
between the optimized and the empirical networks. Interestingly, the topology measures for minimized and
maximized networks are often similar. Not unexpectedly, due to the the large number of small exposures in
empirical networks, the thresholded networks often appear more similar (based on various network measures)
to the optimized ones than to the empirical ones.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to propose a straightforward method for quantifying the systemic risk
reduction potential in financial exposure networks. We are able to compute the (approximate) mimimum
systemic risk which is theoretically attainable in a financial exposure network under given economic con-
straints. In summary, the proposed optimization approach leads to a drastic reduction of systemic risk
(DebtRank) in interbank networks, while keeping the overall economic conditions of banks (their total as-
sets, liabilities, and average risk) practically unchanged. The obtained optimal financial networks can be
used as a best-case benchmark for systemic risk in empirical financial networks with a given total market
volume, equity, assets, liabilities, and possibly other constraints. It allows us to estimate the maximum
systemic risk reduction potential, and may serve as a benchmark quantity to monitor the divergence of
actual markets from- or convergence to their systemic risk optimum.
In the literature, reducing systemic risk in financial markets is typically discussed in the context of
introducing higher capital requirements. Since systemic risk is inextricably linked to the topology and
details of the underlying financial networks, the question arises of how much systemic risk can be taken
out of the system by reorganizing the underlying financial networks. First contributions in this direction
were Thurner and Poledna (2013), Poledna and Thurner (2016), Leduc and Thurner (2017), and Pichler
et al. (2018). Here we have shown that the network-based systemic risk reduction potential is potentially
huge, when compared to what can be gained from increased capital surcharges, a` la Basel III, (Poledna
et al., 2017). We showed in detail how the quantification of minimal systemic risk can be achieved by a
reorganization of the financial network with Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP). The optimization
can be performed with readily available MILP solvers.
We demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed method by applying it to a data set consisting of
10 quarterly observations of the Austrian interbank market, where we focus on the 70 largest banks in the
sample, which cover about 86% of total assets, and 71% of the interbank assets. The optimization shows that
DebtRank can be reduced on average by a factor of 3.5, under constraints that guarantee that the banks’
interbank assets and liabilities, as well as their leverage ratio weighted interbank loan exposure are kept
constant. We find evidence that the largest players in the interbank market still remain systemically relevant
after optimization (even though much less so), whereas the DebtRank values for most small and medium
sized banks are reduced to levels, which are systemically negligible. In the empirical networks small banks
often “punch above their weight” with respect to systemic risk, i.e. their default is causing disproportionately
large systemic losses. The optimization remedies this problem, such that the systemic risk caused by banks is
approximately proportional to their size. In other words, the problem of ‘too central to fail’ can be addressed
by reorganizing the underlying network topologies, while the problem of ‘too large to fail’ remains, at least
to a certain extent. It is reasonable to conclude that for systemic risk-efficient allocations (i.e. the optimized
networks) the individual systemic risk becomes more proportional to liabilities.
Our findings highlight the role of financial network topology to understand and substantially reduce
systemic risk. Policies that explicitly account for the network structure of financial markets are a necessary
and efficient way to reduce systemic risk. An obvious policy proposal has already been made in Poledna
and Thurner (2016) and Leduc and Thurner (2017), where it is suggested to tax (or insure) the externalities
of systemically risky transactions and thus introduce an incentive scheme to avoid those; in effect, the
network topology changes towards more optimal topology. Future research could focus on comparing the
realized systemic risk reductions from these incentives schemes with the theoretically obtainable systemic
risk minimum that is obtainable with the proposed method, and if the two methods yield similar network
topologies. As we mentioned, it might be desirable to introduce additional constraints to the optimization
scheme that enforce other desired economic constraints on the agents. Moreover, to ensure appropriate
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diversification of the agents, desired link densities can be controlled by (e.g. L1-norm) constraints, or by
adding penalty terms for sparsity in the objective function.
We showed that networks restructure significantly due to the optimization. The most prominent feature
is that the minimized (and maximized) networks are sparse with average link densities of around 4.4% (11%
for the maximized), in contrast to the empirical networks that show about 56%. Thus, we find that sparse
networks can have potentially both, a very low, and a high DebtRank. Similar levels of link densities for
optimal interbank networks have also been found by Aldasoro et al. (2017) and Krause et al. (2019).
Conversely, this means that for non-sparse systems a reduction in connectivity could result in either
higher or lower systemic risk. This phenomenon should be further clarified. Non-monotonic behaviour of
systemic risk as a function of link density has been observed in the literature (Nier et al., 2007; Gai and
Kapadia, 2010; Glasserman and Young, 2016).
Another related topic in the literature on contagion is that the relationship between link density and
systemic risk is usually associated with the trade off between the diversification of risk on the individual
bank level and system-wide stability. Diversification effects are usually assumed to be larger for higher link
densities, which in turn can lead to higher overall systemic risk compared to networks with less risk sharing
(lower link density), compare Allen and Gale (2000), Battiston et al. (2012b), Battiston et al. (2012a), or
Aldasoro et al. (2017). Since we find that systemic risk can be high or low for a given value of the link
density, our findings suggest – consistent with intuition – that the diversification effect on the system wide
stability strongly depends on the details of how the risk is shared among banks. Future research could focus
on the dependence of topological network characteristics and their relation to DebtRank for optimized and
partially optimized networks.
Let us finally mention limitations of the approach. Due to the anonymous nature of data it was not
possible to estimate realistic probabilities of default in the Austrian banking system. When we assign a
default probability to every bank, we do it in a static way before optimization, and assume that the rewiring
of the links does not change the default probability. However, this might be not entirely unrealistic, since
for every bank we keep the credit risk weighted exposure constant. Consequently, the credit quality of
banks should not be affected by the rewiring and thus not affect the credit quality of their creditors. We
mention ways to determine default probabilities more realistically in Appendix D. Once default probabilities
are available they can be implemented in the optimization constraints as shown. Another shortcoming is
that for simplicity we assumed a simple maturity scheme for financial assets. Obviously, it would be of
practical interest to generalize the approach to a more realistic maturity scheme that could become valuable
as soon maturities become available in interbank exposure data. Finally, we considered only a single layer
of exposures. However, it is known that systemic risk may strongly depend on different layers of financial
exposures (Leo´n et al., 2014; Poledna et al., 2015; Molina-Borboa et al., 2015; Poledna et al., 2018). An
interesting extension of this present work would be to understand the effect of multiple exposure layers and
their interactions on the minimum systemic risk. It is conceivable that optimization becomes technically
much more challenging for multilayer networks.
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Figure A.5: Visualisation of a single term of the objective function, f(Lij) = min
(
Lij
aj
ej
, aj
)
. For the example we set
ej = 10, aj = 7. The slope for Lij ∈ [0, 10) is aj/ej , and 0, for Lij > 10. For Lij = ej , we have that f(Lij) = aj , which is the
maximal functional value. The two variables y2k−1 and y2k are defined as y2k−1 = min(Lij , ej), and y2k = min(Lij − ej , 0).
Appendix A. Details on the MILP
This section contains the details on the structure of the constraint matrices introduced in Section 3
and visualizes the behavior of the objective function as mentioned in Section 3. Matrix A1 contains the
constraints corresponding to the reformulation of the min(.) in the objective function, Eq. 7. Consider the
constraints from Eq. (15) to (18)
y2i−1 ≥ δ2ie¯i ,
y2i−1 ≤ δ2i−1e¯i ,
y2i ≤ δ2iui ,
δ2i−1 ≥ δ2i ,
where ui = max
(
0,min
(
a¯i, l¯i
)− e¯i). We have to consider that the size of every pair (y2i−1, y2i), representing
one value in the liability matrix is constrained by the respective row and column sums of the matrix, and
the equity value of the borrowing bank. We recall that the correspondence of the variables is L, x, y is
Lkl = L(
i−(d ine−1)n,d ine
) = xi = y2i−1 + y2i.
Let’s denote the upper bound for y2i by ui = max(0,min(a¯i, l¯i) − e¯i), and recall that the upper bound
for y2i−1 is e¯i. The first 2N2 columns correspond to the y variables. The second 2N2 columns correspond
to the vector of dummy variables δ, which indicate if the respective yj is positive or zero. For each entry of
the matrix L and the corresponding xi there are four rows enforcing the constraints from Eq. (15) to (18).
Note that the diagonal elements of L are forced to zero by specifying the upper bound and lower bound in
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the optimization software to zero. The structure of A1 is schematically depicted as
A1 =
1 2 ... 2i − 1 2i ... 2N2 − 1 2N2 2N2 + 1 2N2 + 2 ... 2N2 + 2i − 1 2N2 + 2i ... 4N2 − 1 4N2
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −e¯1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e¯1 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −ub1 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
...
4i − 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −e¯i 0 0 0 0
4i − 2 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e¯i 0 0 0
4i − 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −ubi 0 0 0
4i 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0 0 0
...
4N2 − 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −e¯
N2 0
4N2 − 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e¯
N2
4N2 − 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −ub
N2
4N2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 1.
The matrix A2 is responsible for the column sum constraint A2z = a. Note that A2 ∈ RN×4N
2
+ , where the
last 2N2 columns are zero columns as the binary vector is not in use here. Since, the diagonal elements of
L are set to zero the correct column sum must be achieved through the other N − 1 entries in the respective
column. Since, x = (L11, . . . , LN1, L12 . . . , LN2, . . . , L1N , . . . , LNN )>, the first N entries of x correspond to
the first column of L, the next N + 1 to 2N entries to the second column and so on. This translates again
to y and the first 2N2 columns of A2 follow the diagonal structure below. For a more compact notation12
of A2, we define the vectors ιi of length 2N as
ι1 = (02, 12N−2)
ι2 = (12, 02, 12N−4)
ιi = (12i−2, 02, 12N−2i)
ιn = (12N−2, 02).
Where 02 = (0, 0) and 1i = (1, . . . , 1) of length i. Then, A2 has the following structure
A2 =

ι1 0 . . . 0 0 0 02n2
0 ι2 0 . . . 0 0 02n2
... 0 . . . . . .
... 02N2
0
...
. . . ιi 0 0 02N2
0 0 0 . . . 0 02N2
0 0 . . . 0 0 ιN 02N2

,
and since the rows of A2 are of length 4N2, 0 must be of length 2N , as ι.
Matrix A3 enforces the constraints on row sums and has a similar structure as A2. Again the first 2N2
entries correspond to the y values and the latter ones are corresponding to the binary variables and are zero.
Again, we set 02 = (0, 0) and 12 = (1, 1), and define a sequence of auxiliary matrices B1, B2 . . . , BN with
dimension N × 2N as
12In the following we slightly abuse notation and use the subscript for defining the dimension of vectors having a constant
value.
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B1 =

02 02 . . . 02 02 02
02 12 02 . . . 02 02
... 02
. . .
. . .
...
02
...
. . . 12 02 02
02 02 02
. . . 02
02 02 . . . 02 02 12

.
B2 =

12 02 . . . 02 02 02
02 02 02 . . . 02 02
... 02 12
. . .
...
02
...
. . .
. . . 02 02
02 02 02 12 02
02 02 . . . 02 02 12

.
Bi =

12 02 . . . 02 02 02 02
02
. . . 02 . . . 02 02 02
... 02 12
. . .
... 02
02
...
. . . 02 02 02 02
02 02 02 12
. . . 02
02 02 . . . 02
. . .
. . . 02
02 02 02 02 02 02 12

.
Then A3 can be defined as block matrix
A3 =
[
B1 B2 . . . Bi . . . BN 02N2×2N2 .
]
(A.1)
Matrix A4 is responsible for keeping the credit risk weighted exposure to other banks constant for each
interbank loan portfolio. Recall that the credit riskiness of bank i is κi, and the credit risk weighted
exposure of the empirically observed matrix is r = L>κ. Then, A4 is a κ-weighted version of A2. Let
ν1 = ι1 · κ
ν2 = ι2 · κ
...
...
...
νN = ιN · κ,
where · denotes the pointwise multiplication of two vectors. Then A4 can be defined as
A4 =

ν1 0 . . . 0 0 0 02N2
0 ν2 0 . . . 0 0 02N2
... 0 . . . . . .
... 02N2
0
...
. . . νi 0 0 02N2
0 0 0 . . . 0 02N2
0 0 . . . 0 0 νn 02N2

. (A.2)
This completes the set of constraints for the MILP.
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Figure B.6: Comparison of the empirical asset-liability network, L, as observed in Q1 (a), with a thresholded network, where
the 454 largest links are shown that cover 90% of the interbank market volume. The link density decreases from around 62%
in (a) to 9.4 % in (b), which is visibly sparser. (c) Minimized network (same as in Figure 4 (b)). (d) Maximized network in
the same quarter. The color represents a high DebtRank (red), low systemic risk is blue.
Appendix B. Network visualization and topology measures
This section contains the details on the network visualization and provides additional figures on the
effects of the optimization on the network structure.
Figure B.6 (a) shows a visualization of the empirically observed network of the 70 largest Austrian banks
for quarter Q1, same as Figure 4 (a) in the main text. The link density is around 62%. (b) shows the same
network, but thresholded such that only the largest links accounting for 90% of interbank market volumes
are used. This reduced network has an link density of about 9.4%. Figure B.6 (c) shows the minimized
network for the same quarter Q1, which has a link density of 4.4%. The respective maximized network is
visualized in Figure B.6 (d). It has an link density of around 12%. In all four panels node size corresponds
to the equity of the node, and the link width corresponds to the size of the respective liability, Lij . Since
link- and equity values differ strongly in size, we employed transformations of the quantities to provide a
more readable presentation of the networks. Values are first compressed by taking the square root and
then standardized by the maximal edge size, Lmaxij = max{L0.5ij |∀ij ∈ {1, . . . , n}2}, and maximal equity size,
Emaxi = max{E0.5i |∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}, to get values between zero and one. Then we multiply by a factor of 15.
Dark red and dark blue nodes indicate high and low DebtRank Ri, respectively, lighter tones show medium
sized values. Network visualization were produced with the igraph R package Csardi and Nepusz (2006).
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Figure B.7 plots the individual bank DebtRanks Ri against the banks’ interbank liabilities li for all
quarters. In general DebtRanks Ri are higher for banks with large interbank liabilities li. It is clearly visible
that in the optimized networks bank DebtRanks are more proportional to the banks’ interbank liabilties
than in the original network. This is also supported by the higher correlation of 0.86 for the optimized
network than for empirical network where the correlation is 0.75. For the empirical network the relationship
looks non linear and small banks “punch highly above their weight”. The optimization resolves this issue
and renders small banks systemically negligible.
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Figure B.7: Comparison of individual bank DebtRanks, Ri, with interbank liabilities li for the empirical (red squares) and the
minimized (blue triangles) networks for all ten quarters. It is clear that the optimization strengthens the relationship between
banks’ interbank liabilities li and their DebtRank Ri. In saver networks systemic risk is more proportional to bank size, than
in the riskier empirical ones. The optimization shows smaller banks can be rendered systemically negligible by changing the
network topology.
The following Figure B.8 provides a more detailed perspective on the local network properties such as
the in- and our- degree distributions the clustering behavior, and the weighted nearest neighbor degree for
the four different network types. The measures are pooled over all ten observations. Figure B.8 (a) shows
the distribution of the out-degrees kout for the four different network types across all ten observations;
empirical (red), minimized (blue), maximized (green), thresholded (yellow). (b) shows the distribution of
the in-degrees kin for the four different network types across all ten observations. In both cases, degrees of
the minimized networks are severely peaked in the range of 0 and 3.5. Only at the value of 70 there is small
mass for the out-degree. The maximized networks peak between 3.5 and 7 and are right-skewed. There is
small mass at 70 for the in-degree. The empirical network degrees have a wide distribution with most mass
around 55 for the out-degree and 45 for the in-degree. The thresholded network degrees are peaked between
0 and 3.5 and decay fast. Figure B.8 (c) shows the distribution of the local clustering coefficient Ci for the
four different network types. There are obvious differences. The empirical clustering coefficient distribution
has the bulk of its mass at values around 0.85, whereas the thresholded network is bi modal and has its mass
equally divided between zero and one. The distribution for the minimized networks has its mass distributed
across the whole spectrum with peaks at 0.7 and 1 and the remainder of the mass is allocated at smaller
values. The distribution of the maximized networks is rather flat and distributed between 0.2 and 0.8 with
a peak around 0.55. (d) shows the distribution of the weighted nearest neighbor degree kwnn,i for the same
networks. Again, there are obvious differences. The kwnn,i for the empirical networks are centered around 65,
whereas the thresholded network values are distributed between 0 and 60 with a slight peak at around 30.
The values of the minimized network are right skewed with a peak around 7. The values for the maximized
networks are ranging between 10 and 50 with a peak at around 20.
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Figure B.8: (a) shows the distribution of the out-degrees, kout, for the four different network types, empirical (red), minimized
(blue), maximized (green), thresholded (yellow). Data is pooled for the ten quarters. (b) in-degree distribution of kin for the
same networks (c) Distribution of the local clustering coefficient, Ci. There are obvious differences. (d) Distribution of the
nearest weighted neighbor degree, kwnn,i.
Appendix C. Comparing results with DebtRank2
This section investigates the robustness of the proposed optimization with respect to the definition of
DebtRank. For this reason we substitute the original DebtRank defined in Battiston et al. (2012c) by
a variation that was proposed in Bardoscia et al. (2015), which we call DebtRank2. We find that the
minimization procedure is still producing networks with lower systemic risk when DebtRank is interchanged
with DebtRank2. However, there are differences. DebtRank2 R2 is reduced on average by 15% from 59 to
50. We present the corresponding plot to Figure 1 (a) and (b) in Figure C.9. The first observation is that
the levels for DebtRank2 are substantially higher than for the original DebtRank. Additionally we see that
when the ratio L¯/E¯ increases, as shown in Figure 1 (c), the systemic risk reduction potential for DebtRank2
is diminishing in the last two observations. Furthermore, in C.9 (b) we can observe that the single bank
DebtRanks are more homogenous in comparison to Figure 1 (b).
Appendix D. Estimating credit riskiness and data needs
Since in the empirical part of this paper we focus on a direct exposure network, the specification of
the credit risk variable, κ, needs to be considered. We suggest three state-of-the-art approaches to specify
the credit riskiness of individual banks, which are found in McNeil et al. (2015). However, all of them
have specific data needs, and to a large extent, this data is usually not publicly available. Thus we need
to employ a proxy for κ instead. The first and probably most broadly applicable choice for κ are ratings,
which are assigned to banks by rating agencies like Standard and Poors, Moodies and Fitch, which consider
historical probabilities of default (PDs) for the respective rating class as κ. The disadvantage of this is
that agencies usually update their ratings gradually and ratings are sticky to a certain extent. In suddenly
deteriorating economic environments of financial crises, the ratings might not reflect the actual risk. The
second approach suggested is using an analytical model, which can be calibrated to publicly available data.
23
D
eb
tR
an
k2
 o
f t
he
 n
et
wo
rk
, R
2
Q1 Q3 Q5 Q7 Q9
32
41
50
59
68
77 (a) Empirical
Optimized
D
eb
tR
an
k2
 o
f i
nd
ivi
du
al
 b
an
ks
,
 
R
i2
(b)
Q1 Q3 Q5 Q7 Q9
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Empirical
Optimized
Figure C.9: Same as Figure 1 (a) and (b) but for the definition of DebtRank2. In comparison to the ordinary DebtRank we
see that the DebtRank2 levels are substantially higher for both the emprical and the minimized networks. In quarter Q10 both
the empirical and the minimized DebtRank apporach the theoretical maximum of DebtRank 69 for a network of 70 banks.
The minization works best for Q8 where the ratio of interbank market volume and equity L¯/E¯ is smallest. (b) shows that the
optimization works better for smaller banks.
One of the most popular structural credit risk models is the Merton model (Merton, 1974). Several versions
are used in practice to calculate PDs. The advantage of the model is that it can be calibrated with publicly
available balance sheet data and stock market prices. The incorporation of stock market data captures most
recent information. The third approach would be to consider CDS spreads of banks and infer the PDs from
a reduced form credit risk model, which is calibrated to the observed CDS spreads. In the reduced form
approach the CDS spreads used to calibrate the model take into account current market information.
All of these approaches are generally difficult to put into practice, since for small banks there might be
insufficient information available to calibrate an analytical model. A possible solution could be to use credit
risk estimates of banks, where the data is available and perform a regression analysis with accounting ratios
as independent variables. The so fitted model could be used to obtain an estimate for the banks for which
the necessary information is not accessible.
Appendix E. Equality vs. inequality in the credit risk constraint
min
L ∈ {M ∈ RN×N+ : diag(L)=0}
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
min
(
Lij
ej
, 1
)
aj
L¯
(P1)
subject to: li =
n∑
j=1
Lij ∀i , (C1)
ai =
N∑
j=1
Lji ∀i , (C2)
ri =
N∑
j=1
Ljiκj . (C3)
We show that in the formulation of the optimization problem (P1) changing the credit risk constraint
(C3) from equality (=) to greater or equal than (≥), does not change the solution, when the row and column
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sum constraints (C1) and (C2) are in place. This is intuitively clear, because the row sum constraint keeps
the amount of interbank liabilities in the system constant. This implies that also the total sum of credit
risk weighted liabilities
∑N
j=1 rj =
∑N
j=1 κj lj must remain constant. If now one or more banks would have
a lower credit risk weighted exposure ri after the optimization than before the optimization and none of the
banks has a higher risk weighted exposure rj (as implied by the ≥ constraint) this means that the total risk
weithed exposure
∑N
j=1 rj must be smaller after the optimization than before the optimization, which is a
contradiction to the statement that
∑N
j=1 rj must remain constant, because the li remain constant.
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